Thailand’s Election and the Risk of Pre-Election Border Escalation

Thai party leaders will face off in the coming election. ANN/The Nation

#opinion

As Thailand moves closer toward a national election, renewed tension along the border with Cambodia deserves careful attention. Elections heighten political incentives, and in systems where the military plays a prominent public role, nationalism can become an attractive tool for mobilising swing voters in the final days of the campaign.

In Thailand, sovereignty narratives have long carried political weight. We have heard Anutin Charnvirakul citing “sovereignty” countless times in media interviews as if Thailand was being aggressively subsumed by a regional power. Border disputes with Cambodia especially, but also the southern border with Malaysia and western frontier with Myanmar, offer a ready-made stage for assertive nationalist messaging. In a heated campaign environment, even limited incidents can be amplified to project firmness, shift attention from economic pressures and reinforce the image of military-backed parties as defenders of the nation against perceived threats from neighbouring countries.

Escalatory behaviour need not be dramatic to be consequential. Sharper rhetoric, heightened patrols, symbolic shows of force or “landmine incidents” can quickly raise border tensions. Cambodia fell victim to such escalations in 2008 and again in July and December in 2025, all starting from one-sided landmine incidents suffered by Thai troops. Such moves are often politically useful at home, even if they complicate diplomacy and regional stability.

The role of the Royal Thai Armed Forces is central to this dynamic. Their show of determination as defenders of Thailand resonates with the electorate, especially when Thai media ecosystems reward hardline narratives.

There are indeed some constraints for the RTA in using escalation at this time. Thailand’s economy is highly sensitive to instability, especially cross-border trade and tourism which already saw a decrease in 2025 due to the border clash with Cambodia.

Regional partners notably Malaysia, China, India, Singapore, Indonesia and Vietnam favour restraint, while the US has viewed the Cambodian-Thai border clash as an unnecessary burden in a world where conflicts have saturated global attention.

As an iron-clad friend of Cambodia, China invested heavily in the recent rise of Cambodia and sees Cambodia as an exceptional example of a responsible development partner that manages debt well. Any destruction by the RTA against China-funded projects such as roads and bridges run counter to development efforts. Cambodia is also a prominent member within China’s BRI.

During the run-up to the Thai election in early February 2026, one should expect intensified sovereignty language and selective emphasis on border incidents which could lead to a full-blown military confrontation after the election, depending on the results. Such confrontation can become a convenient alternative to “Thai coup.” The responsibility — on all sides — is to ensure that short-term political messaging does not undermine long-term peace and stability in a region that can ill afford another cycle of violence.

Kok-Thay Eng is a Phnom Penh-based political analyst. The views and opinions expressed are his own.

-The Phnom Penh Post-