Why Cambodia seeks compulsory conciliation under UNCLOS
UNCLOS is an international treaty with a legal framework for governing maritime and marine activities. Khmer Times
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Law is the foundation of equal sovereignty. It is what allows small and large states alike to stand before the same rules, claim the same rights, and invoke the same principles of justice.
Without law, international relations would descend into a contest of power. Borders would become vulnerable to force. Sovereign rights would be subject to pressure. Smaller states would be asked not what is legal, but what they are strong enough to defend.
This is why Cambodia’s decision to pursue compulsory conciliation with Thailand under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is legitimate and necessary. It is a legally grounded response to Thailand’s unilateral withdrawal from the 2001 Memorandum of Understanding on overlapping maritime claims.
For more than two decades, Cambodia and Thailand managed their maritime dispute through that bilateral framework. That framework was built on a basic assumption: both sides would negotiate in good faith, avoid unilateral action, and work towards a fair and mutually acceptable settlement.
Thailand’s withdrawal from the MoU changed that assumption. It weakened the very mechanism that had helped contain the dispute and created new uncertainty over the future of maritime negotiations.
The issue is therefore not simply whether Cambodia and Thailand should continue talking. Cambodia has never rejected negotiation. The real question is whether negotiation can remain meaningful when one party withdraws from an agreed framework and then seeks to return to talks under altered conditions.
Good-faith negotiation does not mean endless negotiation. Nor does it mean negotiation under pressure. It requires seriousness, consistency, and respect for the legal rights of the other party.
International law does not reward unilateralism. It requires restraint, good faith, and respect for agreed procedures. Thailand’s withdrawal from the 2001 MoU reflects a troubling logic: the use of unilateral action to create pressure and push Cambodia towards Thailand’s preferred outcome.
Cambodia has already seen similar behaviour from Thailand along the land boundary, where faits accomplis are created on the ground before law is allowed to speak. Cambodia has consistently protested and rejected through legal and diplomatic means the illegal occupation of its territory by Thai forces. The same manoeuvres must not be allowed to move from land to sea.
It is crystal clear that sovereign rights cannot be negotiated under coercion. Disputes over fisheries, seabed resources, energy security, maritime jurisdiction, and environmental protection must be settled by law, not by pressure or unilateral action.
If Thailand truly seeks a peaceful and equitable settlement, it should have no reason to oppose a legal process under UNCLOS.
Maritime disputes are often politically sensitive, economically valuable, and legally complex. Ordinary diplomacy may not be sufficient when trust has weakened and unilateral action has disrupted the negotiating environment. That is why the convention provides structured mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
Compulsory conciliation is part of that treaty-based system. It is not an extraordinary measure. It is not an escalation. It is a procedure accepted by states when they become parties to UNCLOS. It introduces impartial third-party assistance while preserving space for negotiation and compromise.
This is what makes conciliation particularly suitable for the Cambodia-Thailand maritime issue. Unlike litigation or arbitration, conciliation does not impose a binding judgment on the parties.
A conciliation commission listens to both sides, examines the evidence, clarifies the legal and practical issues, and recommends a fair basis for settlement. It is more structured and holistic than open-ended bilateral talks, but less adversarial than a courtroom battle.
Conciliation also offers flexibility. It allows both parties to address not only the legal question of maritime delimitation, but also the broader practical concerns that often make maritime disputes difficult to resolve. These may include resource management, joint development, fisheries protection, environmental safeguards, maritime safety, and regional stability.
International experience shows the value of this approach. The Timor-Leste-Australia compulsory conciliation under UNCLOS helped move a difficult maritime boundary dispute towards a treaty-based settlement. The process addressed not only delimitation, but also practical arrangements for resource development. It demonstrated that conciliation can help states manage sensitive questions of sovereignty, resources, and national interest without resorting to confrontation.
The Jan Mayen conciliation between Iceland and Norway offers a similar lesson. Although the parties requested assistance on continental shelf delimitation, the commission also proposed practical arrangements for resource cooperation. The recommendation went beyond a narrow legal line-drawing exercise, yet it helped create a basis for settlement. This shows that conciliation can be both legal and pragmatic.
That flexibility matters for Cambodia and Thailand. Their maritime dispute is not only about drawing a line on a map. It concerns sovereign rights, fisheries, seabed resources, energy security, maritime safety, environmental protection, and stability in the region. A structured conciliation process can place these issues within a broader legal and practical framework.
Compulsory conciliation combines law, diplomacy, and restraint. It creates a win-win pathway towards an equitable and peaceful solution.
This approach is fully consistent with Cambodia’s broader commitment to sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-use of force, and peaceful settlement of disputes.
Cambodia’s demand for the end of illegal occupation of its territory by Thai forces is grounded in law. Cambodia cannot accept unilateral action, coercion, or pressure as a basis for determining sovereign rights.
The larger issue is not only a bilateral maritime dispute. It is about the kind of regional order Southeast Asia wishes to uphold. If unilateral withdrawal, coercive pressure, and faits accomplis are tolerated, the region will move closer to a dangerous logic in which might makes right. If law is upheld, even difficult disputes can be managed peacefully, fairly, and with dignity.
Cambodia’s choice of compulsory conciliation under UNCLOS is therefore a responsible act of statecraft. It affirms that law must prevail over force, procedure over pressure, and peaceful settlement over unilateralism.
Chheang Vannarith is Chairman of the National Assembly Advisory Council. The views expressed here are his own.
-Khmer Times-
